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Abstract
In this paper we study iterative procedures for stationary equilibria
in games with large number of players. Most of learning algorithms for
games with continuous action spaces are limited to strict contraction best
reply maps in which the Banach-Picard iteration converges with geomet-
rical convergence rate. When the best reply map is not a contraction,
Ishikawa-based learning is proposed. The algorithm is shown to behave
well for Lipschitz continuous and pseudo-contractive maps. However, the
convergence rate is still unsatisfactory. Several acceleration techniques
are presented. We explain how cognitive users can improve the conver-
gence rate based only on few number of measurements. The methodology
provides nice properties in mean field games where the payoff function
depends only on own-action and the mean of the mean-field. A learning
framework that exploits the structure of such games, called, mean-field
learning, is proposed. The proposed mean-field learning framework is
suitable not only for games but also for non-convex global optimization
problems. Then, we introduce mean-field learning without feedback and
examine the convergence to equilibria in beauty contest games, which
have interesting applications in financial markets. Finally, we provide a
fully distributed mean-field learning and its speedup versions for satis-
factory solution in wireless networks. We illustrate the convergence rate
improvement with numerical examples.
1 Introduction
Recently there has been renewed interest in large-scale games in several re-
search disciplines, with its uses in financial markets, biology, power grid and
cloud networking. Classical work provides rich mathematical foundations and
equilibrium concepts, but relatively little in the way of learning, computational
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and representational insights that would allow game theory to scale up to large-
scale systems. The literature on learning in games with discrete action space is
huge (see [1, 3, 30] and the references therein). However, only few results are
available for continuous action space. In this paper, we explain how the rapidly
emerging field of mean-field games can address such behavioral, learning and
algorithmic issues.
We propose both model-based (but still with less information) and non-
model-based learning schemes for games with continuous action space and large
number of players. Each player will update her learning strategies based on
an aggregative term [15], which is the sum of action of the other players. Each
player will be influenced by the aggregate, and the mean field behavior is formed
from the contributions of each player. In the model-based mean-field learning
scheme, the mean action will be read by the players at each time slot, and each
player will respond to the aggregative term locally. This simplifies drastically
the dimensionally of the best-response system in the asymptotic case.
We distinguish different types of learning schemes depending on the infor-
mation requirement:
(i) Partially distributed strategic learning [30], where each player knows
her own-payoff function, has some computational capabilities and observes the
actions of the other players at the previous step. Examples of such learning
schemes include best response algorithms, fictitious play, and logit algorithms.
(ii) Fully distributed strategic learning: In many dynamic interactions, one
would like to have a learning and adaptive procedure which does not require
any information about the other players actions or payoffs and less memory
as possible (small number of parameters in term of past own-actions and past
own-payoffs). Fully distributed learning algorithms are only based on numerical
measurements of signals or payoffs. The mathematical structure of own-payoff
functions are not assumed to be known by the player. Hence, gradient-like ascent
and best-reply algorithms cannot be used directly. The observations of private
signals/measurements are not explicit in the actions of the other players. Based
on numerical measurement of realized own-payoff, each player employs a certain
learning pattern in order to learn the expected payoff function (payoff-learning)
as well as the associated optimal strategies (model-free strategy-learning). This
type of learning algorithm is referred as Combined fully DIstributed PAyoff and
Strategy learning (CODIPAS, [29, 31, 2]). These algorithms are simple but
they play an important role in terms of applications since they are based on
experiments and real data. In the continuous action space case, the gradient of
own-payoff is not observed and hence it needs to be estimated or learned if one
wants to use a gradient-like ascent method. However, estimating an accurate
gradient based only on a sequence of payoff measurements is not a trivial task.
(iii) No-feedback learning where the players do not observe any numerical
payoff measurement. These schemes are based only on estimations and offline
adjustment. However, conjectures and hierarchical reasoning could be used in
order to get consistent reactions.
In all the above three categories of learning algorithms, the combination
of the learning patterns of all the players form a multidimensional interactive
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system. The question we address is whether it is possible to exploit the structure
of the payoff functions in large-scale regime to reduce the complexity of the above
learning algorithms (partially or fully distributed).
The answer to this question is positive for some aggregative games. We
examine three classes of mean-field learning frameworks:
• Partially distributed mean-field learning where each player knows her own-
payoff function, has some computational capabilities and observes the
mean field at the previous step. Examples of such learning algorithms
include best response to mean field and Boltzmann-Gibbs mean-field re-
sponse.
• Fully distributed mean-field learning schemes can be used in situations
where each generic player in the large population is able to observe/measure
a numerical value of her own-payoff (that could be noisy). These schemes
are derivative-free and model-free. They can be applied in both mean-field
games and mean-field global optimization.
• No-feedback mean-field learning: There are some situations where it is
difficult to feedback any information to the population of players and
local measurement of own-payoff is not available. Then, the above two
classes of learning algorithms that are based on feedbacks to the players
are inappropriate. In that case, a learning scheme without feedback can
be employed if the payoff functions are common knowledge.
1.1 Overview: learning for games with continuous action
space
We briefly overview fully distributed learning for games with continuous action
space. One of the first fully distributed learning algorithms is the so-called
reinforcement learning. While there are promising results in Markov decision
processes with few number of states and actions, majority of reinforcement
Q-learning, adaptive heuristic critic, and regret minimizing multi-arm bandit
algorithms meet several difficulties in continuous action space. The difficulty in
extending such learning algorithms to multi-player games is that with a balance
has to be maintained between exploiting the information gained during learning,
and exploring the set of actions (with is a continuum) to gain more information.
Instead of updating a finite dimensional probability vector, one has to adjust a
probability density function in infinite dimensional space. The authors in [32]
has proposed reinforcement learning algorithms for games with continuous and
compact action space applied to vehicle suspension control. The convergence
analysis is not conducted in [32] .
In [33] the authors studied continuous action reinforcement learning au-
tomata and applied to adaptive digital filters. The authors claimed convergence
of their algorithm via computer simulations.
Recently, [34] observed a poor performance and selection of basis functions
that are used in [32, 33] to approximate the infinite dimensional space. It is
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conjectured that the convergence time (when it converges) is very high even for
quadratic cost function.
In order to reduce the dimensionality, the basic idea in these continuous
action space reinforcement learning studies has been to use a normal distribution
at each time slot and updates the mean and standard deviation based on the
payoff measurement.
Another approach to continuous action space learning is the regret mini-
mizing procedure that allows to be close to the Hannan set. Such a procedure
have been widely studied for discrete action space and has several interesting
computational properties: the set of correlated equilibria is convex and there is
polynomial time algorithm. The extension to continuous and compact action
space has been conducted in [35]. It is shown that the empirical frequencies
of play converges to the set of correlated equilibria. However, most of these
convergence results are not for a point but a set and the convergence time is
not provided in [35]. Another important point is that the convergence of the
frequency of play does not imply the convergence of actions or strategies. All
the above references consider finite number of players.
In this work we are interested on learning in games with large number of
players and continuous action space. The framework presented here differs
from classical machine learning for large-scale systems. The main difference
is the strategic behavior of the players who make decisions in a distributed and
autonomous manner. This creates an interdependency between the decisions
through the mean of the mean-field.
1.2 Contribution
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we introduce a learning
framework for games with large population of players, called mean-field learn-
ing. Considering payoff functions that depend on own-input and an aggregative
term, we show that mean-field learning simplifies drastically the analysis of
large-scale interactive learning systems. In the single class case, it reduces to
the analysis of one iterative process instead of an infinite collection of learning
processes. Second, we study both asymptotic [40] and non-asymptotic proper-
ties of the resulting learning framework. Stability, error bounds and accelera-
tion techniques are proposed for model-based mean-field learning as well as for
derivative-free mean-field learning. In particular, we show that the convergence
time of (o+ 1)−order speedup learning is at most
Tη∗ =
1
ln(o+ 1)
ln


ln
(
1
η∗c
1
o
2
)
ln
(
1
η0c
1
o
2
)


where η∗ is the error target, c2 is a positive value which does not depend on
time and η0 is the initial error gap. Interestingly, the methodology extends to
satisfactory solution (which is a situation where all the players are satisfied). We
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provide fully distributed mean-field learning schemes for satisfactory solution in
specific games. Reverse Ishikawa and Steffensen speedup learning are proposed
to improve the convergence rate to satisfactory solution. Numerical examples
of the basic learning techniques are illustrated and compared in guessing games
and in quality-of-service (QoS) satisfaction problems in wireless networks.
1.3 Structure
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a generic mean-
field game model. In Section 3 we present the mean-field learning framework.
In Section 4 we present a detailed example of beauty contest mean-field game.
Speedup strategic learning for satisfactory solution are presented in Section 5.
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
The proofs are given in Appendix.
2 Mean field game model
Consider n ≥ 2 players. Each player takes her action in the convex set A ⊆
Rd, d ≥ 1. Denote the set of players by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the standard for-
mulation of a game, a player’s payoff function depends on opponents’ individual
actions. Yet, in many games, payoff functions depend only on some aggregate of
these, an example being the Cournot model where it is the aggregate supply of
opponents that matters rather than their individual strategies. The main prop-
erty of aggregative games is the structure of the payoff functions. The payoff
function of each player depends on its own action and an aggregative term of
the other actions. A generic payoff function in aggregative game with additive
aggregative term is given by rj : A2 −→ R
r˜(a) = rj

aj , 1
n− 1
∑
j′ 6=j
aj′

 , (1)
where the actions are real numbers and r˜ : An −→ R. In this context the key
term of player j is the structure of the function rj , its own-action aj and the
aggregative term 1n
∑n
j′=1 aj′ .
The triplet G := (N ,A, (r˜j)j∈N ) constitutes a one-shot game in strategic
form.
Applications 1 The type of aggregate-driven reward function in (1) has wide
range of applications:
(a) In economics and financial markets, the market price (of products, good,
phones, laptops, etc) is influenced by the total demand and total supply,
(b) In queueing theory, the task completion of a data center or a server is
influenced by the mean of how much the other data centers/servers can serve.
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(c) In resource sharing problems, the utility/disutility of a player depends on
the demand of the other players. Examples include cost sharing in coalitional
system and capacity and bandwidth sharing in cloud networking.
(d) In wireless networks, the performance of a wireless node is influenced by
the interference created by the other transmitters.
(e) In congestion control, the delay of a network depends on the aggregate
(total) flow and the congestion level of the links/routes.
Definition 1 The action profile (aj)j∈N is a pure equilibrium of the game G if
no player can improve her payoff by unilateral deviation i.e., for every player
j ∈ N , one has
r˜j(a) ≥ r˜j(a′j , a−j), ∀a′j ∈ A
Before going for pure equilibrium seeking we first need to ask if the problem is
well-posed, i.e; the existence of a pure equilibrium. Below we provide a classical
sufficiency condition for existence of a pure equilibrium in continuous-kernel
aggregative games.
The following results hold:
• compactness: If A is a non empty, compact, convex subset of Rd, and each
rj is (lower semi-) continuous in A2 and quasi-concave with the respect
to the first variable then G possesses at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
• IfA is non-compact, we require additional coercivity assumption: r˜j(aj , a−j) −→
−∞ as ‖ aj ‖−→ +∞.
For discontinuous payoff function rj we refer to the recent development of
existence of pure equilibria. A very active area is the full characterization for
the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with general topolog-
ical strategy spaces that may be discrete, continuum or non-convex and payoff
functions that may be discontinuous or do not have any form of quasi-convexity.
For more details, see the literature review in Tian (2009, [13]).
Below we examine only the cases in which the game admits at least one
equilibrium and the best-response is uniquely given by the mapping f (which
is not necessarily continuous). We present aggregate-based learning algorithms.
Generically, a partially distributed mean-field-based learning scheme can be
written as aj,t+1 = Fj(aj,t, . . . , aj,0, m¯n,t, . . . , m¯n,0) where F is specified from
the game model and m¯n,t is a mean action of the players at time t. In this
paper we examine only schemes with one-step memory in the form aj,t+1 =
Fj(aj,t, m¯n,t)
2.1 Aggregate-based best-response
Let m˜j,n =
1
n−1
∑
j′ 6=j aj′ be the mean of actions of the others. We assume that
argmaxa′j rj(a
′
j , m˜j,n) has a unique element which we denote by f¯j(a−j). Then,
f¯(a) = (f¯j(a−j))j is the best-response map. We aim to find a fixed-point of such
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a map in An which is in an Euclidean space with dimension nd. Exploiting the
aggregative structure of the game and the convexity of the set A, the domain
of the function f¯j is reduced to the set A by the following relation f¯j(a−j) =
fj(m˜j,n) where m˜j,n ∈ A by convexity of the domain A. The simultaneous best-
response algorithm, called mean-field response, is given in Algorithm 1 which
requires that player j observes the common term m¯n,t−1 =
1
n
∑n
j′=1 aj′,t−1 at
the previous step and computes
m˜j,n,t−1 =
1
n− 1 (nm¯n,t−1 − aj,t−1) .
Algorithm 1 : Mean-field response
1: Initialization :
for each user j ∈ N initialize aj,0,
2: Learning pattern :
for each time slot t
for each user j ∈ N do
Observe the aggregate m¯n,t
aj,t+1 = fj(m˜j,n,t) = fj
(
1
n−1 (nm¯n,t − aj,t)
)
2.2 Banach-Picard learning algorithm
One of the first basic iterative procedures for finding fixed-point of the contin-
uous map f over complete metric space A is the Banach-Picard iterate. The
algorithm consists to start at some point a0 ∈ A, and take the compositions
f(a0), f(f(a)), . . . , that is at+1 = f(at), where f : A −→ A. This algorithm
is known to be convergent for strict contraction map, i.e., if there exists a Lip-
schitz constant 0 < L < 1 of the function f then the iterates converge (with
geometric convergence rate L) to the unique fixed-point of f in A. However,
in many applications of interest the function f may not be a contraction. See
Example 1 below.
Theorem 1 ([5]) Let (A, d) be a complete metric space, and f : A −→ A a
map for which there exist real numbers α1, α2 and α3 satisfying 0 < α1 < 1, 0 <
α2, α3 < 1/2 such that for each pair a1, a2 in A, at least one of the following
conditions is true:
(C0) d(f(a1), f(a2)) ≤ α1d(a1, a2);
(C1) d(f(a1), f(a2)) ≤ α2[d(a1, f(a1)) + d(a2, f(a2))];
(C2) d(f(a1), f(a2)) ≤ α3[d(a1, f(a2)) + d(a2, f(a1))].
Then, the Banach-Picard algorithm converges to a fixed-point of f for any initial
point a0 ∈ A. Moreover, f has a unique fixed-point.
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Note that the first part of Theorem 1 C0 has many applications in solving
nonlinear equations, but suffers from one drawback - the contractive condition
(C0) forces f to be continuous on A. However, the second condition (C1) does
not require continuity of the best response function f. The condition (C1) have
been studied by Kannan (1968, [12]) and (C2) by Chatterjea (1972, [11]).
Example 1 (Resource sharing game) Consider n players in a network with
a resource capacity cn > 0. Each player has a certain demand aj ≥ 0 which
corresponds to her action. The action space is R+. Denote by pn > 0 the unit
price for each resource utilization. The payoff function is
rj(a) = cn
aj
ǫn +
∑n
j=1 aj
− pnaj ,
where ǫn is a positive parameter. Then, the (simultaneous) best-response algo-
rithm is given by
at+1 =
[√
cn
pn
(ǫn + (n− 1)at−1)− (ǫn + (n− 1)at−1)
]
+
and
f(a) =
[√
cn
pn
(ǫn + (n− 1)a)− (ǫn + (n− 1)a)
]
+
.
A direct computation of the derivative (at the interior) gives
f ′(a) = −(n− 1) + cn(n− 1)
pn
(
cn
pn
(ǫn + (n− 1)a)
)−1/2
.
Clearly, f is not a contraction.
Example 2 A non-convergent Banach-Picard iteration is obtained for A =
[ 14 , 4], and f(a) = 1/a. f is 16−Lipschitz in the domain A. Let start with a0 6= 1
then a2t = a0, a2t+1 =
1
a0
6= a0. The two subsequences a2t and a2t+1, t ≥ 0
have different limits. Hence, the sequence at+1 = f(at) does not converge if the
starting point is a0 6= 1.
We explain below how to design a convergent sequence for the problem of Ex-
amples 1 and 2. A simple modification of Banach-Picard consists to introduce
a learning rate λ which takes the average between the previous action and the
best response, at+1 = λf(at) + (1 − λ)at. Then, the procedure evolves slowly.
The idea goes back at least to Mann (1953, [8]) and Krasnoselskij (1955, [7]).
For λ equal to one, one gets the Banach-Picard algorithm.
If the function f satisfies (Lipschitz and strongly pseudo-contractive map)
(C3) ‖a1−a2‖ ≤ ‖a1−a2+s[a1−f(a1)−ka1−(a2−f(a2)−ka2)]‖
for any pair (a1, a2) ∈ A2, where s > 0, k > 0, and there is λ¯ such that for any
λ, 0 < λ < λ¯, the learning algorithm converges to a fixed-point. However, for λ
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closer to one, the algorithm may oscillates around a fixed-point. In order to get
a smaller λ in the long-run, we can attempt to take a decreasing learning rate
λt −→ 0 as t grows.
∑∞
t=1 λt = +∞.
The algorithm (also referred to as Mann’s algorithm [8]) reads
at+1 = λtf(at) + (1− λt)at (2)
0 < λt < 1, a0 ∈ A. (3)
Algorithm 2 : Mann-based mean-field response
1: Initialization :
for each user j ∈ N initialize aj,0,
Define the sequence up to T : λj,t for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }
2: Learning pattern :
for each time slot t
for each user j ∈ N do:
Observe the aggregate m¯n,t
aj,t+1 = λj,tfj [
1
n−1 (nm¯n,t−1 − aj,t−1)] + (1 − λj,t)aj,t
If the function f does not satisfy C0, one can still get some convergence
results due to Ishikawa [10, 9].
at+1 = λtf (µtf(at) + (1 − µt)at) + (1− λt)at (4)
0 < λt < 1, 0 ≤ µt ≤ 1. (5)
a0 ∈ A. (6)
Clearly, the same technique can be extended to a finite number of composi-
tions of the mapping f.
Algorithm 3 : Ishikawa-based mean-field response
1: Initialization :
for each user j ∈ N initialize aj,0,
Define the sequence up to T : λj,t for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }
2: Learning pattern :
for each time slot t
for each user j ∈ N do:
Observe the aggregate m¯n,t
aj,t+1 = λj,tfj(yj,t) + (1− λj,t)aj,t
yj,t = µj,tfj
(
1
n−1 (nm¯n,t−1 − aj,t−1)
)
+ (1− µj,t)aj,t
Figure 1 illustrates a cycling behavior of the mean-field response of example
1. The parameters are µj,t = 0, λt = 0.9, n = 10, ǫn = 0, cn = 1, pn = 1, a0 =
0.005. For λ = 0.1 smaller than the one in Figure 1, the cycle disappeared and
the Ishikawa’s based mean-field response scheme behaves well. See Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Mann-based mean-field response for example 1 with big learning rate:
presence of limit cycle.
2.3 Faster algorithms: Banach-Picard vs Ishikawa
For a class functions satisfying one of the conditions C0-C2, we know from
Theorem 1 that there is a unique fixed-point of f and the speed of convergence
of the algorithm can be compared for different parameter µt. Suppose that at
and bt are two real convergent sequences with limits a
∗ and b∗ respectively.
Then {at}t is said to converge faster than {bt}t if limt d(at,a
∗)
d(bt,b∗)
= 0
The authors in [6, 5] showed that for a particular class of functions that
satisfies one of the conditions C0, C1 or C2, the Banach-Picard algorithm is
faster than the Ishikawa’s algorithm with µt = 0 is faster than the one with
µt > 0. However in general these algorithms are not comparable due to non-
convergence. For example for f(a) = 1/a, A = [1/4, 4] there is a unique fixed
point but Banach-Picard does not converge starting from a0 6= 1. However, the
Ishikawa method converges to 1 for λ small enough.
2.4 Reverse Ishikawa mean-field learning
The reverse Ishikawa’s mean-field learning consists to choose a learning rate
(bigger than one) that converges to one.
at+1 = λtf(at) + (1− λt)at (7)
1 < λt < 2, lim
t
λt = 1, a0 ∈ A. (8)
Example of λt could be 1+
1
1.5t .When convergent, this scheme has the advantage
of being faster than the fixed-point iteration.
10
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Action at
M
an
n 
ba
se
d 
m
ea
n−
fie
ld
 re
sp
on
se
Figure 2: Ishikawa’s based mean-field response for example 1 with small learning
rate.
2.5 Non-asymptotic properties
We focus on the non-asymptotic properties of the Ishikawa-based learning al-
gorithms. Non-asymptotic strategic learning is very important in engineering
applications. Traditional results on the fundamental limits of data compression
and data transmission through noisy channels apply to the asymptotic regime
as codelength, blocklength goes to infinity. However, these asymptotic results
are not usable if the window size and horizon are bounded. Therefore, it is
interesting to look at the non-asymptotic regime of learning algorithms. We
provide generic rate of convergence of some class of best-response functions.
2.5.1 Strict contraction
For strict contraction mapping f with constant α1 = L < 1, one has the follow-
ing estimates:
d(at, a
∗) ≤ α
t
1
1− α1 d(a0, a
∗), t > 0.
The advantage of this inequality is that it provides a error gap at any time
which is a non-asymptotic learning result.
2.5.2 Nonexpansive best-response function
The next result provides the convergence rate of the asymptotic regularity for
nonexpansive maps i.e., the class of map with Lipschitz constant α1 = 1. Denote
by diameter(A) the diameter of the set A.
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Theorem 2 ([4]) Let f : A −→ A is a nonexpansive self-mapping of a bounded
convex subset A of a normed linear space, normalized so diameter(A) < +∞
with non-empty fixed-point set fix(f); the Ishikawa algorithm with µt = 0 and
λt = λ ∈ (0, 1), is a proper convex combination then
d(at, f(at)) −→ 0.
Moreover
d(at, f(at)) ≤ diameter(A)√
π
∑t
t′=1 λt′(1− λt′)
.
If A is unbounded, the following estimate holds:
d(at, f(at)) ≤ 2 d(a0, f ix(f))√
π
∑t
t′=1 λt′(1 − λt′)
.
We observe that when
∑t
t′=1 λt′ (1−λt′) −→ +∞ one gets the so-called asymp-
totic regularity of the sequence generated by the Ishikawa algorithm.
2.5.3 Strongly pseudocontractive
Theorem 3 ([14]) Let f Lipschitz with constant L and strongly pseudocon-
tractive with constant k such that fix(f) is non-empty. Then the Ishikawa
algorithm with λt = λ ∈ (0, λ¯), λ¯ = k(L+1)(L+2−k) , µt = 0 converges strongly
to the (unique) fixed point of fix(f). The convergence rate is geometric and is
given by
d(at, f ix(f)) ≤ d(a0, f ix(f))ρ(λ)t
where
ρ(λ) =
1 + (1− k)λ+ (L+ 1)(L + 2− k)λ2
1 + λ
,
which is minimized for λ∗ = −1 +
√
1 + λ¯.
2.6 Asymptotic pseudo-trajectories
Using classical approximation the asymptotic pseudo trajectories of Ishikawa’s
algorithm can be studied using ordinary differential equations (ODEs). We
assume that the function f has a unique integral curve, in order to guarantee
the uniqueness of the ODE (given a starting point).
2.6.1 µt = 0
The ODE is given by
a˙j =
d
dt
aj = fj(m˜j,n)− aj ,
which is the aggregate-response dynamics in continuous time.
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If fj denotes a best response of m˜j,n then the steady state of the aggregate-
response dynamics are Nash equilibrium of the aggregative game. If the dy-
namics has a Lyapunov function then one gets a global convergence to Nash
equilibria. These games are called Lyapunov games.
Now we turn to the convergence time for a given error/precision. We define
the convergence time Tη of at within a η−neighborhood as the first time the
trajectory of pure strategy reaches a neighborhood of range η to the set of
fixed-points.
Tη = inf{t ≥ 0, | d(at, f ix(f)) ≤ η}.
2.6.2 How to accelerate the convergence time of the ODE?
Consider the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that captures the trajec-
tories of the learning pattern in transient phase: a˙t = f(at) and b˙t = λtf(bt).
Assume that the two ODEs start at the same point a0 = b0. What can we say
about the trajectories of a and b?
We explicitly give the convergence time of b in function of that of a.
Proposition 1 The explicit solution is given by
bt = a∫ t
0
λs ds
.
In particular, if the trajectory of a reaches a target set O for at most Ta time
units then the trajectory of b reaches the same set for at most Tb = g
−1(Ta)
where g : t −→ ∫ t
0
λs ds.
If λs = λ, then Tb =
Ta
λ .
If λs = e
s, then Tb= ln(Ta + 1), i.e.,
Tb
Ta
goes to zero and b is faster than a.
3 Mean-field learning
We now consider a continuum of players. The mean-field is the action distri-
bution m. Its mean is in the set A and is denoted by m¯. Then the limiting
payoff for single class writes r(a, m¯). All the functions fj above are reduced a
single function f(m¯), i.e., each player responds to the mean of the mean-field.
Therefore the Banach-Picard (mean-field response) dynamics becomes
at+1 = f¯(at, m¯t)
which can be reduced to
at+1 = f¯(at, m¯t) = m¯t+1 = f¯(m¯t, m¯t) =: f(m¯t) (9)
by indistinguishability property.
Thus, Banach-Picard-based mean-field response learning is given by
m¯t+1 = f(m¯t), (10)
13
Note that in Equation (10) only the starting point m¯0 is required if the player
knows the structure of f. This means that it is not needed to feedback the mean
of the mean-field at each step.
Proposition 2 Consider a mean field game r(a, m¯) such the mean field re-
sponse function f is a strict contraction mapping over A (non-empty, con-
vex subset of Rd) with constant α1. Then, the mean-field response learning
(10) finds an approximated fixed-point within a η−neighborhood in at most
Tη = 1 + ⌊max(0, T )⌋ number of iterations where T = ln[
d(m¯0,fix(f))
η(1−α1)
]
ln 1α1
.
The Ishikawa-based mean field response is
m¯t+1 = λtf [µtf(m¯t) + (1 − µt)m¯t] + (1− λt)m¯t (11)
0 < λt < 1 , 0 ≤ µt ≤ 1 (12)
m¯0 ∈ A. (13)
Based on Theorem 2, the next Proposition provides an upper bound of the
convergence time in order of O( 1η2 ).
Proposition 3 Consider a mean field game r(a, m¯) such the mean field re-
sponse function f is a nonexpansive mapping over A (non-empty, convex subset
of Rd). Then, the Ishikawa based mean-field learning (11) finds an approximated
fixed-point within an η−neighborhood in at most Tη = 1 + ⌊max(0, T )⌋ number
of iterations where T = 16d(m¯0,fix(f))
2
η2π .
Proposition 4 provides a convergence time bound in order of O(ln( 1η )) for
Lipschitz with constant L and strongly pseudocontractive mean-field response
function f.
Proposition 4 Let f Lipschitz with constant L and strongly pseudocontrac-
tive with constant k such that fix(f) is non-empty. Then the Ishikawa algo-
rithm with λt = λ ∈ (0, λ¯), λ¯ = k(L+1)(L+2−k) , µt = 0 converges strongly to
the (unique) fixed point of fix(f) with at most Tη = 1 + ⌊max(0, T )⌋ number
of iterations where T =
ln[
d(m¯0,fix(f))
η ]
ln 1
ρ(λ∗)
, ρ(λ∗) = 1+(1−k)λ
∗+(L+1)(L+2−k)(λ∗)2
1+λ∗ ,
λ∗ = −1 +
√
1 + λ¯.
3.1 How to accelerate the convergence rate?
We have seen in the previous sections that under suitable conditions one can ap-
proximate fixed-points. However, the major concern associated with the above
fixed-point iteration is that the iterates exhibit only linear convergence rate
which may be unacceptably slow.
Speedup strategic learning is a method that studies learning mechanisms
for speeding up the convergence based on few experiences. The input to a
speedup technique typically consists of observations of prior realized sequence
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of experience, which may include traces of the measurements of the real problem.
The output is knowledge that the technique can exploit to find solutions more
quickly than before and without seriously effecting solution quality.
Our motivation for speedup learning is two-fold:
• Traditional results on the fundamental limits of data compression and
data transmission through noisy channels apply to the asymptotic regime
as codelength, blocklength goes to infinity. However, these asymptotic re-
sults are not usable if the window size and horizon are bounded. Speedup
strategic learning is aimed exclusively at finding solutions in a more prac-
tical time frame. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the non-asymptotic
regime using speedup learning algorithms.
• Speedup strategic learning aims to create adaptive scheme that can learn
patterns from few number of experience that can be exploited for effi-
ciency gains. Such adaptive schemes have the potential to significantly
outperform traditional learning schemes by specializing their behavior to
the characteristics of the fixed-point problem.
Consider a convergent mean-field learning with exhibit a sequence {m¯t}t.
Suppose now that only few number of the sequence are available to the users.
Each user aims to learn an approximate fixed-point based only minimal number
of information about the estimates m¯0, m¯1, . . . , m¯T−1. The goal of a generic
user is to accelerate the previous learning algorithm and transform the slowly
converging sequence into a new one that converge to the exact limit m¯∗ as the
first one, but faster. If possible, we aim to be as close as possible to m¯∗ based
only on the T observations of the sequence {m¯t}t.
Definition 2 Assume that m¯t converges to m¯
∗ and let ηt = |m¯t − m¯∗|. If If
two positive constants c1, o > 0 exist, and lim supt
ηt+1
ηot
= c1
then the sequence {m¯t}t is said to converge to m¯∗ with order of convergence
o. The number c1 is called the asymptotic error constant. The cases o ∈ {1, 2}
are given special consideration.
(i) If o = 1 the convergence of {m¯t}t is called linear.
(ii) If o = 2 the convergence of {m¯t}t is called quadratic.
(iii) If o = 3 the convergence of {m¯t}t is called cubic.
3.1.1 Partially distributed speedup methods
We present speedup learning in one-dimensional space. However, most of the
speedup schemes below extends to multi-dimensional action spaces.
Quadratic order speedup techniques
The basic Newton method consists to iterate
m¯t+1 = m¯t − g(m¯t)
g′(m¯t)
. (14)
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If g(m¯∗) = 0 and g′(m¯∗) 6= 0 then the Newton’s method generates a
quadratic convergence rate locally: ηt+1 = |m¯t+1 − m¯∗| ≤ h
′′(αt)
2 η
2
t , where
αt is in a neighborhood of m¯
∗ and h(y) = y − g(y)g′(y) .
For multiple roots, the scheme can be modified to be
m¯t+1 = m¯t − k g(m¯t)
g′(m¯t)
or apply the Newton method to the function gg′ .
3.1.2 Cubic order speedup techniques
One of the most studied cubic technique is the Halley’s method which consists
to update as
m¯t+1 = m¯t − 2g(m¯t)g
′(m¯t)
2[g′(m¯t)]2 − g(m¯t)g′′(m¯t)
3.1.3 Arbitrary order speedup techniques
We start with Householder’s speedup method [27]. If the map f is known by the
player then the classical fixed-point iteration is m¯t+1 = g(m¯t) = f(m¯t)− m¯t. A
(o+ 1)− order speedup learning is given by
m¯t+1 = m¯t + o
(1/g)(o−1)(m¯t)
(1/g)(o)(m¯t)
where o is an integer and (1/g)(o) is the derivative of order o of the inverse of
the function g.
It is well-known that if f is a (o+1) times continuously differentiable function
and m¯∗ is a fixed-point of f but not of its derivative, then, in a neighborhood
of m¯∗, the iterates m¯t satisfy:
|m¯t+1 − m¯∗| ≤ c2|m¯t − m¯∗|o+1,
for some constant c2 which is obtained by taking the bound of the derivatives
of the function g at m∗. The bound is finite because of continuity over compact
set. This means that the iterates converge to the fixed-point if the initial guess
is sufficiently close, and that the convergence has rate (o + 1). Thus, if f is an
infinitely differentiable function, this scheme makes a very fast locally convergent
speedup learning algorithm with arbitrary high order. In particular, for o = 1
this is the Newton’s method, for o = 2 it is called Halley’s method.
For the case where the function f is smooth with a unique fixed-point, we
can systematically generate, high order, quickly converging, mean-field learning
methods, of any desired degree, for the solution of fixed-point problem. Fast
converging mean-field learning methods like those should be of great use in
large-scale algorithms that require the repetitive solution of a nonlinear equation
many times over long time periods and where an efficient solution algorithm is
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imperative to avoid overtime computations. This reduces the so-called cost of
impatience, i.e., the cost due to the error gap to the solution. We now present
our main result on the convergence time of the (o+ 1)-order speedup scheme.
Theorem 4 Let c2 < 1 and η0 = |m¯0 − m¯∗| < 1 and o > 0. Then the scheme
is convergent and the error at iteration t, ηt is bounded by
ηt ≤ c
(o+1)t−1
o
2 η
(o+1)t
0
Thus, the convergence time to an η∗−range of the pure mean-field equilibrium
is
Tη∗ = 1 + ⌊max(0, T )⌋
where
T =
1
ln(o+ 1)
ln


ln
(
1
η∗c
1
o
2
)
ln
(
1
η0c
1
o
2
)


3.1.4 Derivative-free speedup methods
The most well known sequence transformations are Aitken’s ∆2− process (1926,[18]),
Richardson’s extrapolation algorithm (1927, [23]), Shanks transformation (1955,[22]),
Romberg transformation 1955 [19], Wynn’s ǫ−algorithm (1956, [25, 26]). These
speedup techniques are not based on derivatives. This is why they are used
more frequently in practical computations.
Next we present a superlinear order derivative-free speedup technique, called
Secant method. It is inspired from Newton’s method where the term g(a)−g(a
′)
a−a′
replaces the derivative.
Secant speedup method
In the Secant speedup method (Algorithm 4), we define the sequence m¯2, m¯3, m¯4, . . .
using two initial guesses, m¯0 and m¯1 and the formula:
m¯t+1 = m¯t − g(m¯t)(m¯t − m¯t−1)
g(m¯t)− g(m¯t−1) (15)
which can be obtained when replacing g′(m¯t) by
g(m¯t)−g(m¯t−1)
m¯t−m¯t−1
in Equation (14).
Note that the Secant method can be written as m¯t+1 = F (m¯t, m¯t−1) which is a
two-step memory scheme, since two previous values are required to calculate the
next value in the sequence. The Secant speedup method converges with order
around 1.6, i.e., more quickly than a method with linear convergence, but more
slower than a method with quadratic convergence.
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Algorithm 4 : Secant speedup method
1: Initialization :
Make a starting guess m¯0, m¯1
2: Speedup learning pattern :
for each time slot t
Observe m¯t and compute g(m¯t)
Compute m¯t+1 = m¯t − g(m¯t)(m¯t−m¯t−1)g(m¯t)−g(m¯t−1)
Aitken’s speedup method
The new sequence that accelerates the convergence via Aitken extrapolation is
y¯t = m¯t − (m¯t+1 − m¯t)
2
m¯t+2 − 2m¯t+1 + m¯t ,
which is obtained by solving the equation m¯t+1−y¯m¯t−y¯ =
m¯t+2−y¯
m¯t+1−y¯
.
Steffensen’s speedup method
Steffensen’s speedup method (Algorithm 5) is a variant of the Aitken method
that uses the Aitken formula to generate a better sequence directly:
Algorithm 5 : Steffensen’s speedup method
1: Initialization :
Make a starting guess a0
2: Speedup learning pattern :
for each time slot t
Compute m¯1 = f(m¯0), m¯2 = f(m¯1)
Use Aiken’s speedup method to compute y¯0
reStart with y¯0
Remark 1 Sometimes one has attempted to compare Newton, Secant, Aitken
and Steffensen speedup methods. So, which method is faster? Ignoring con-
stants, it would seem obvious that Newton’s method (model-based speedup tech-
nique) is faster than Secant method (non-model speedup technique), since it
converges more quickly. However, to compare performance, we must consider
both computational cost and speed of convergence. An algorithm that converges
quickly but takes a few seconds per iteration may take far more time overall than
an algorithm that converges more slowly, but takes only a few milliseconds per
iteration. So, the comparison is not fair. For the purpose of this general anal-
ysis, we may assume that the computational cost of an iteration is dominated
by the evaluation of the function. So, the number of function evaluations per
iteration is likely a good measure of cost. The secant method requires only one
function evaluation per iteration (the function g), since the value of g(m¯t−1)
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can be stored from the previous iteration. Newton’s method requires one func-
tion evaluation and one evaluation of the derivative per iteration. It is difficult
to estimate the cost of evaluating the derivative in general. In some cases, the
derivative may be easy to evaluate, in some cases, it may be much harder to
evaluate than the function (if it is possible at all). If we can run two itera-
tions of the secant speedup method in the time it will take to run one iteration
for computing the derivative in Newton’s method. Then, two iterations of the
Secant speedup method should be compared to Newton’s speedup method. But
Secant method with two iterations has a speedup in order of 2o > 2, hence faster
than the Newton’s method.
The Aitken speedup method requires three consecutive terms of the sequence
m¯t to reproduce a quadratically convergent speedup technique.
3.2 Fully distributed derivative-free mean field learning
We now present a fully distributed mean-field learning based on the work of
[24]. Each generic player adjusts its action based on numerical measurement of
own-payoff (with some i.i.d noise). The first order learning scheme with large
number of players is given in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 : Mean-field learning with first order sinusoidal perturbation
1: Initialization :
for each user j ∈ N do
aj,0,
2: Learning pattern :
for each time slot t
for each user j ∈ N do
Observe a realized payoff rj,t
aˆj,t+1 = aˆj,t + λj,tkjrj,tǫj sin(wj tˆj + φj)
aj,t = aˆj,t + ǫj sin(wj tˆj + φj)
tˆj =
∑t
t′=1 λj,t′
where λj,t, kj , ǫj > 0, φj ∈ R.
The mean of the mean-field generated by Algorithm 6 is given by
mˆj,t+1 = mˆj,t + lim inf
n
1
n
∑
j
λj,tkjrj,tǫj sin(wj tˆj + φj),
mj,t = mˆj,t + lim inf
n
1
n
∑
j
ǫj sin(wj tˆj + φj).
Let ηj,t := aj,t − a∗j . From Taylor expansions ∂ajrj(at) = ηt∂2ajajrj(a∗) +
O(|ηt|2) and ∂2ajajrj(at) = ∂2ajajrj(a∗) + O(|ηt|). In the first order sinusoidal
learning, the error rate is proportional to the second derivative (Hessian of the
payoff). Since the payoff function is unknown to the players, it is difficult to
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tune the convergence rate with the appropriate parameters. Therefore, we es-
timate the Hessian and construct a dynamics that converge asymptotically to
the pseudo-inverse of the Hessian. The local behaviour of the second order sinu-
soidal learning will be independent of the Hessian which is of big importance in
non-model learning where the Hessian is unknown. The second order sinusoidal
perturbation mean-field learning is given in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 : Mean-field learning with second order sinusoidal perturbation
1: Initialization :
for each user j ∈ N do
aˆj,0,
2: Learning pattern :
for each time slot t
for each user j ∈ N do
Observe a realized payoff rj,t
aˆj,t+1 = aˆj,t + λj,tkj dˆ
(2)
j,t rj,t
2
ǫj
sin(wj tˆj + φj)
aj,t = aˆj,t + ǫj sin(wj tˆj + φj)
dˆ
(2)
j,t+1 = (1 + λj,twc)dˆ
(2)
j,t + λj,t
[
−wcdˆ(2)j,t s(2)j,t rj,tdˆ(2)j,t
]
tˆj =
∑t
t′=1 λj,t′
where λj,t, kj , wc, ǫj > 0, φj ∈ R.
The product of s
(2)
j,t rj,t needs to generate an estimate of the Hessian in a
time-average sense and dˆ
(2)
j,t+1 should generate an estimate pseudo-inverse of the
Hessian. Example of function s
(2)
j,t is
1
ǫ2j
(sin2(wj tˆj + φj)− 1).
3.3 Feedback-free mean-field learning
Below we develop a learning algorithm without feedback (no mean-field feed-
back, or other actions at the previous step are not observed, [16]) but with
knowledge of the mathematical structure of the payoff function. Feedback-free
mean-field learning is very important and is therefore empirically testable. In
it, players think that others are likely to take the some function of actions as
themselves, resulting in a false consensus or non-false consensus depending on
one’s view of the irrationality of the behavior and incompatibility of beliefs and
conjectures.
A simple example of feedback-free learning consists to take a speedup version
of m¯t+1 = f(m¯t) starting from some estimate of the initial point and iterate
offline.
Mean-field global optimization
Consider the average payoff in the form 1n
∑
j∈N r(aj , m¯j,n,t) which is in general,
not concave in the joint action. The asymptotic regime is
∫
r(a, m¯)m(da) which
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can be analyzed using measure theory. In particular, if the integral can be
written as a function of only the first moment of the mean-field m, i.e., r¯(m¯)
then the above mean-field learning schemes can be used to learn the mean-field
social optimum.
Example 3 We consider the payoff function in the following form: rj(a) =
ajh(
∑n
i=1 ai
n )−paj . Then total payoff of all the players is
∑n
j=1 rj(a) = Dh(D/n)−
pD where D is the total sum of actions. By dividing by n, one gets
1
n
n∑
j=1
rj(a) =
D
n
h(D/n)− pD
n
= m¯nh(m¯n)− pm¯n
The dimensionality of the global optimization problem can be significantly re-
duced to be one-dimensional, i.e., It suffices to optimize the function zh(z)−pz.
The local extrema of this scalar function can be found using the above techniques.
This means that a mean-field optimization can be conducted easily for any
limiting function in the form of ah(m¯) + β1a+ β2g(m¯) + β3 where βi’s are real
numbers and h, g are limiting functions of the mean of the mean-field.
In next section, we apply mean-field learning and speedup techniques in
beauty contest game or guessing game.
4 Beauty contest game
We revisit the beauty contest game in the context of mean-field. The name
of this game and its basic idea go back to John Maynard Keynes (1936) who
compared a clever investor to a participant in a newspaper beauty-contest where
the aim was to guess the average preferred face among 100 photographs. The
initial beauty contest game was analyzed for integers, although in 1993 the
German economist Rosemarie Nagel based her experiments on a nice variant
of the game, played by Keynes’ newspaper readers: Each player chooses a real
number between 0 and 100 inclusively. The number need not be an integer. A
player wins if its number is closest to 2/3 of the average of the numbers given
by all participants.
There are two ways to see that a unique equilibrium solution exists. First,
one can easily see that no one should submit a number higher than 66, because
whatever the others do, a guess higher than 66 cannot be better than 66. How-
ever, if no one guesses more than 66, then all numbers between 44 (that is, two
third of 66) and 66 are inferior to 44. Hence no one would guess more than 44
and so on. until 0 is the only remaining reasonable choice. (Note that a second
solution besides 0 is 1 if only integers are allowed).
A second method would be to just try out: Presume you guess a certain
number a, and anyone else guesses the same number a, would you still wish to
stick to your initial guess a? If so, you have found a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Now the only a to which you would want to stick is 0.
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More generally, in a beauty contest game, n ≥ 3 players simultaneously
choose numbers aj in some interval, say, [0,M ], M > 0. The average of their
numbers m¯n =
1
n
∑
j aj is computed, which establishes a target number pm¯n,
where 0 < p < 1 is a parameter. The player whose number is closest to the
target pm¯n wins a prize αn. The generic payoff is
rj(a) = αn
1l{aj∈argmina′
j
|a′j−pm¯n|}∑
i 1l{ai∈argmina′
i
|a′i−pm¯n|}
This model of beauty contest games were studied experimentally by Nagel
(1995, [17]).
These games are useful for estimating the number of steps of iterated domi-
nance players use in reasoning through games. To illustrate, suppose p < 1.
Since the target can never be above pM , any number choice above pM is
stochastically dominated by simply picking pM . Similarly, players who obey
dominance, and believe others do too, will pick numbers below p2M so choices
in the interval (p2M,M ] violate the conjunction of dominance and one step of
iterated dominance. We iterate this progressively and get that ptM −→ 0, then
the unique Nash equilibrium is 0. Now, if p > 1 then the equilibrium is M. If
p = 1 every feasible symmetric action profile is an equilibrium.
We now consider a small modification of the guessing game in order to get
interior equilibria. The target is changed to be µ + pm¯n, µ ≥ 0 The generic
payoff is
rj(a) = R− κ
∥∥∥∥∥∥aj −

µ+ p
n
n∑
j′=1
aj′


∥∥∥∥∥∥ ,
where (R ≥ 0, κ > 0, µ ≥ 0).
In the asymptotic regime, the interior mean-field equilibrium (if any) should
satisfy m¯ = µ+ pm¯, p < 1, i.e., m¯∗ = µ1−p in the interval [0,M ].
Assuming that the functions are known, we can use a feedback-free mean-
field learning. Therefore, one possible explanation of no-feedback learning in the
beauty contest game (or guessing game) is that players simply take an action,
treat their action as representative of the choices of other players, and then best
respond to this belief mean of the mean-field. This kind of reasoning would
predict convergence towards equilibrium in the guessing game.
The best response dynamics is given by min(M,µ+pm¯t−1) where the starting
point is m¯0 ≥ 0. Each trader starts with an estimate mˆ0. It is clear that for
µ = 0, p < 1 if each trader estimates the initial point and iterate the mean-field
learning process offline, the process converges to the mean-field equilibrium. For
µ > 0, the interior response writes m¯t+1 = µ+ pm¯t.
More generally, one can consider a mean-field payoff in the following form
rj(aj , m¯) = R− κ‖aj − χ(m¯)‖,
where χ is map which has a fixed point in [0,M ]. The best response to the mean
m¯ is χ(m¯) and the mean-field pure equilibrium satisfies a∗ = m¯∗ = χ(m¯∗).
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Hence, learning the mean-field equilibrium reduces to learning a fixed-point of
the maping χ. For χ(m¯) =
√
2m¯+ 3 the iterative process becomes m¯t+1 =√
3 + 2m¯t. Note that 3 is a fixed-point. Let fix the starting point at m¯0 = 4
and M = 100.
We start with g(m¯) = m¯2−2m¯−3 and use the secant speedup method. The
result of acceleration technique (15) is presented in Table 1. We observe that at
the fourth iteration, the secant speedup method has already 10−4 of precision
while the original sequence has a 100 times smaller precision. Next we start
with the initial point 5 for secant method and initial point of 4 for the fixed
point method. We observe that the secant method has better precision than the
fixed-point method after only 3 iterations. This means that the secant speedup
method is robust to initial estimation errors.
Original sequence Secant speedup method
m¯0 = 4 4 5
m¯1 = 3.316624790 3.3166 3.6056
m¯2 = 3.103747667 3.0595 3.1833
m¯3 = 3.034385495 3.0043 3.0232
m¯4 = 3.011440019 3.0001 3.0010
Table 1: Fixed-point and Secant speedup method
We summarize the acceleration technique in Table 2 based only on few steps
of the original sequence.
Original sequence Aitken Steffensen
m¯0 = 4 3.007431293 3.000000510
m¯1 = 3.316624790 3.000862083 3.000000000000002
m¯2 = 3.103747667 3.000097228
m¯3 = 3.034385495
m¯4 = 3.011440019
Table 2: Acceleration of mean-field learning
Assume that only 5 measurements of the mean sequence is given to the
player: m¯0 = 4, m¯1 = 3.316624790, m¯2 = 3.103747667, m¯3 := 3.034385495, m¯4 =
3.011440019.We apply the acceleration technique from these measurements and
one gets y¯0 = m¯0 − (m¯1−m¯0)
2
m¯2−2m¯1+m¯0
= 3.007431293
y¯1 = 3.000862083 and y¯2 = 3.000097228
Clearly, the Aitken sequence {y¯t}t guarantees that will converge faster to
3 and the error will be smaller than that of the original sequence {m¯t}t. If we
reiterate the fixed-point of the sequence but starting from the sequence y¯0. Then,
z¯0 = y¯0 − (y¯1−y¯0)
2
y¯2−2y¯1+y¯0
= 3.000000510. Repeating the acceleration procedure and
taking the fixed-point iteration, one gets z¯1 = 3.000000000000002.The sequence
{z¯t} seems converges to 3 with at least quadratic convergence rate which is great
acceleration from the linear convergence rate of the original sequence. With only
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Figure 3: Illustration of the convergence time bound from Theorem 4. 5 itera-
tions provide already remarkable result.
two iterations of Steffensen’s speedup method one has reached an error of 10−6
which is satisfactory. In Figure 3 we illustrate the bound of Theorem 4 which
states the convergence time with error η∗ = 10−4. We observe that the result of
Figure 3 are similar to the one obtained in Table 2.
5 Speedup strategic learning for satisfactory so-
lution
One of the fundamental challenges in distributed interactive systems is to design
efficient and fair solutions. In such systems, a satisfactory solution is an innova-
tive approach that aims to provide all players with a satisfactory payoff anytime
anywhere. Our motivations for satisfactory solution seeking are the following:
In dynamic interactive system, most users constantly make decisions which are
simply “good enough” rather than best response or optimal. Simon (1956, [36])
has adopted the word “satisficing” for this type of decision. Most of literature
of strategic learning and decision making problems, however, seek only the op-
timal solution or Nash equilibria based on rigid criteria and reject others. As
mentioned by Simon himself in his paper in page 129, “Evidently, organisms
adapt well enough to ’satisfice’; they do not, in general, ’optimize’. Therefore
satisfactory solution offers an alternative approach and is closely model the way
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humans and cognitive users make decisions [37, 38, 39].
Here, a satisfactory strategy is a decision-making strategy that attempts
to meet an acceptability threshold. This is contrasted with optimal decision-
making or best response strategy, an approach that specifically attempts to find
the best option available given the the choice of the other users. Following that
idea we define a satisfaction solution as a situation where every user is satisfied,
i.e., her payoff is above her satisfactory level.
In this section we focus on fully distribution strategic learning for satisfactory
solution in games with continuous action space. For discrete (and finite) action
space we refer to [20]. We show that the methodology in [20] can be extended
to continuous action space as well as to first moment mean-field games. We
illustrate it with a basic example. See also [21].
Definition 3 The action profile (aj)j∈N is a pure satisfactory solution of the
game G if all the players are satisfied:
r˜j(a) ≥ γ∗j , ∀j ∈ N
Before going for pure satisfactory solution seeking we first need to ask if the
problem is well-posed, i.e; the existence of a pure satisfactory solution.
We assume feasibility, that is, γ∗j , j ∈ N , are chosen such that the set
{a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ An | r˜j(a) ≥ γ∗j , ∀j} is nonempty. This means that there
exists a vector (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn), ǫj ≥ 0 such that there is an action profile a that
satisfies ∀j, r˜j(a) = γ∗j + ǫj . Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for
existence of a satisfactory solution is that the vector γ∗ + ǫ belongs to the set
rˆ(An) i.e., the range of the function rˆ(a) := (r˜1(a), . . . , r˜n(a)).
Consider a basic wireless network with n users. The action space is Aj =
[0, aj,max], aj,max > 0. There is a state space R
n×,n
+ , w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) where
wj = (wjj′ )j′ , wjj′ = |hjj′ |2 ≥ 0, hjj′ ∈ C. The payoff of user j in state w is the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio: rj(w, a) = SINRj(w, a) = γj(w, a) =
ajwjj
N0+
∑
j′ 6=j aj′wjj′ ǫjj′
where N0 > 0 is the background noise and ǫjj′ > 0. To goal
of each player is not necessarily to maximize the payoff, it is to get a certain
target γ∗j .
Definition 4 We say that user j is satisfied if γj(w, a) ≥ γ∗j .
A satisfactory solution at state w is a situation a where all the users are satisfied.
Such a situation may not exist in general. We examine the case where there
is at least one solution. Of course if the full state w and all the parameters
are known, one can perform a centralized solution. However, in the distributed
setting, a user may not have access to the information of the other users channel
gains and their locations. Thus, it is important to guarantee a certain quality-
of-service (QoS) with minimal information for all the users. Our goal here is
to develop very fast and convergent fully distributed learning algorithms for
satisfactory solutions. The only information assumption required to each user
is the numerical realized value its own-payoff rj,t and its own-target γ
∗
j . The
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basic Banach-Picard fixed-point iteration is given by
aj,t+1 = projAj
[
aj,t
γ∗j
rj,t
]
,
where projAj denotes the projection operator over the convex and compact setAj , i.e., projAj (x) = min(aj,max,max(0, x)).
Note that max(0, x) = [x]+ =
x+|x|
2 , and min(aj,max, α) =
aj,max+α−|aj,max−α|
2 .
The proposed algorithm is fully distributed in the sense that a user do not
need to observe the actions of the others in order to update its strategy itera-
tively.
Algorithm 8 : Fully distributed Banach-Picard learning for satisfactory solu-
tion
1: Initialization :
Make a starting guess aj,0
2: Banach-Picard learning pattern :
For each time slot t up to T
For each user j ∈ N do:
Observe a numerical value rj,t
Compute aj,t+1 = projAj
[
aj,t
γ∗j
rj,t
]
Next we discuss the convergence of the Banach-Picard learning algorithm
for a fixed state w.
Assumption A0: ρ(Mw) < 1 where Mwj′j =
wjj′γ
∗
j
wjj
and Mwjj = 0.
It is clear that under assumption A0, the system (I − Mw)a = b where
bj =
γ∗jN0
wjj
has a solution. We say that the problem is feasible if (I −Mw)a = b
has a solution and the solution a∗ satisfies 0 < a∗j ≤ aj,max.
Proposition 5 Consider the Banach-Picard learning algorithm for a fixed state
w for which the problem is feasible.
• Suppose that the sequences of action profiles {at}t generated by the Banach-
Picard algorithm converges to some point a∗ that belongs to be relative
interior of
∏
j Aj . Then, a∗ is a satisfactory solution.
• Under the sufficient condition for existence A0 and feasibility condition,
the Banach-Picard iteration converges to a satisfactory solution.
• The convergence rate of the Banach-Picard algorithm for satisfactory so-
lution seeking is geometrical decay and hence the convergence time within
η error tolerance is
Tη = 1 + ⌊max(0, T )⌋
where
T =
ln[d(a0,a
∗)
η ]
ln 1ρ(Mw)
26
Remark 2 (Advantages) This proposition is very important since a satisfac-
tory solution can be seen as a global optimum of the game with payoff function
1l{rj≥γ∗j }, where 1l{.} denotes the indicator function. In particular, the above
algorithm is a fully distributed learning scheme that converges (under the exis-
tence and feasibility condition) to a global optimum (and hence Pareto optimal)
which is remarkable.
Remark 3 (Limitations) The fully distributed Banach-Picard algorithm pro-
posed above is convergent under some range of parameters, and the algorithm
is with minimal information (it is fully distributed). However, the convergence
time is still unsatisfactory. We aim to investigate whether it is possible to get
a faster convergence rate. To do so, we use speedup learning techniques.
One of the first speedup techniques for satisfactory solution is the reverse
Ishikawa’s learning consists to choose a learning rate (bigger that one) that
converges to one.
at+1 = projAj
[
λtaj,t
γ∗j
rj,t
+ (1− λt)aj,t
]
(16)
1 < λt < 2, lim
t
λt = 1, a0 ∈ A. (17)
Theorem 5 Under the same assumption as in Proposition 5 and appropriate
choice of λt, the reverse Ishikawa learning converges faster than the Banach-
Picard learning.
Note that the projection is now required even if Aj is convex because for
λt > 1, one gets 1 − λt < 0 is a not convex combination. In general, it is
difficult to compute in advance the value of λt that will maximize the rate of
convergence.
In order to get a higher order convergence rate, one can use a Steffensen
speedup learning of the reverse Ishikawa.
Remark 4 In the above speedup learning for satisfaction, we have limited our-
selves to the case where the state is quasi-static. However, in wireless networks,
it could be stochastic, leading to a stochastic learning algorithm. Then, the goal
is to find satisfactory solution in expectation. For that case, the assumption on
Mw is too restrictive. The spectral radius of the matrix Mw may not be less
than one for some realized state w. Then, a feasible solution may not exist but
the algorithm converges to aj,max.
In the context of large-scale games, one needs to scale the SINR. By choosing
the parameter ǫ, and aj,max = a¯max > 0, γj = γ
∗ independent of j one can
express the payoff of a generic user as function of aj , m¯, and a load factor α.
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Therefore, the mean-field learning version becomes
m¯t+1 = projA¯
[
m¯t
γ∗
rt
]
(18)
= projA¯
[
γ∗(N¯0 + αm¯t)
]
(19)
m¯0 ∈ A¯ = [0, a¯max]. (20)
Thus, ρ(Mw) = γ∗α < 1 and m¯∗ = N¯0γ
∗
1−γ∗α < a¯max is an interior satisfactory
solution and the payoff of a each generic player is m¯
∗
N¯0+αm¯∗
= m¯
∗
N¯0(1+
αγ∗
1−γ∗α
)
=
m¯∗(1−γ∗α)
N¯0
= γ∗
The reverse Ishikawa is
m¯t+1 = projA¯
[
λtm¯t
γ∗
rt
+ (1− λt)m¯t
]
(21)
= projA¯
[
λtγ
∗(N¯0 + αm¯t) + (1− λt)m¯t
]
(22)
= projA¯
[
λtγ
∗N¯0 + (λtγ
∗α+ (1− λt))m¯t
]
(23)
1 < λt < 2, m¯0 ∈ A¯. (24)
For λt = λ ∈ (1, 2), one can observe compare the spectral radius: 0 < λγ∗α+(1−
λ) < γ∗α < 1 Thus, the reverse Ishikawa learning has a superlinear convergence
rate faster than the Banach-Picard fixed point iteration.
We choose the target SINR to be γ∗ = 20, the scaled background noise
N¯0 = 0.3, and the load is α = 1/30 and a¯max = 20. Then, the problem is feasi-
ble and the satisfactory solution is 18. In table 3 we illustrate the convergence
to satisfactory solution: Banach-Picard and its speedup versions with reverse
Ishikawa and Steffensen. We initialize the mean of the mean field m¯0 = 2 and
observe that 50 iterations of the Banach-Picard learning corresponds approxi-
mately to 25 iterations of the reverse Ishikawa learning and only 5 iterations of
Steffensen speedup algorithm. Figure 4 summarizes the three mean-field learn-
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Figure 4: Mean-field learning for satisfactory solution: Banach-Picard, reverse
Ishikawa and Steffensen.
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t Banach − Picard mt λ = 5/3 Steffensen
1 2.000000000000000 2 12
2 7.333333333333333 10.888888888888888 14
3 10.888888888888888 14.839506172839506 12.000000000000002
4 13.259259259259260 16.595336076817560 9.000000000000002
5 14.839506172839506 17.375704923030028 17.999999999999986
6 15.893004115226336 17.722535521346678 17.999999999999979
7 16.595336076817556 17.876682453931856
8 17.063557384545035 17.945192201747496
9 17.375704923030021 17.975640978554445
10 17.583803282020014 17.989173768246424
11 17.722535521346675 17.995188341442855
12 17.815023680897784 17.997861485085711
13 17.876682453931856 17.999049548926983
14 17.917788302621240 17.999577577300883
15 17.945192201747492 17.999812256578174
16 17.963461467831664 17.999916558479192
17 17.975640978554441 17.999962914879639
18 17.983760652369625 17.999983517724282
19 17.989173768246417 17.999992674544124
20 17.992782512164279 17.999996744241830
21 17.995188341442852 17.999998552996367
22 17.996792227628568 17.999999356887276
23 17.997861485085714 17.999999714172120
24 17.998574323390475 17.999999872965383
25 17.999049548926983 17.999999943540168
26 17.999366365951325 17.999999974906743
27 17.999577577300883
28 17.999718384867258
29 17.999812256578171
30 17.999874837718778
31 17.999916558479185
32 17.999944372319455
33 17.999962914879639
34 17.999975276586426
35 17.999983517724285
36 17.999989011816190
37 17.999992674544124
38 17.999995116362747
39 17.999996744241834
40 17.999997829494557
41 17.999998552996370
42 17.999999035330912
43 17.999999356887276
44 17.999999571258183
45 17.999999714172120
46 17.999999809448077
47 17.999999872965383
48 17.999999915310255
49 17.999999943540171
50 17.999999962360114
Table 3: Acceleration of mean-field learning for Satisfactory solution.
ing trajectories.
The satisfactory solution estimated by Banach-Picard mean-field is m¯∗ =
17.999999962360114 and the the error estimate for m¯∗ in the Banach-Picard
learning is 1.2547× 10−8 after 50 iterations. The first speedup technique based
on reversed Ishikawa with λ = 5/3 > 1 gets 17.999999974906743 after 26 iter-
ations which clearly a superlinear convergence rate. The error estimate of re-
verse Ishikawa speedup is 1.3941×10−8 after 26 iterations starting from m¯0 = 2
which is far away from the satisfactory solution. We can get a higher order
convergence rate. The speedup technique a` la Steffensen provides an error of
7 × 10−15 after only 6 iterations. The numerical gap d(m¯t, f(m¯t)) is in or-
der of 7.105427357601002× 10−15 which is an acceptable error tolerance for 6
iterations.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied mean-field learning in large-scale systems. Our
result shows that in large-scale aggregative games with additive aggregation
term, the mean-field learning simplifies not only the complexity of the problem
(instead of systems of iterative equations, we can just reduce to one-equation
per class or type) but also the information requirement. We have examined both
convergence time and speed of convergence and proposed acceleration techniques
for partially distributed mean-field learning with convergence time in order of
O(log(log 1η )).
In the fully distributed mean-field learning, we have assumed that each player
is able to observe/measure a noisy (numerical) value of her payoff in a linear
way. Now, what happens if this assumption does not hold but a correlated non-
linear signal is observed as output? After an experimentation at time t, player j
observes the realized process Oj,t = f˜(rj,t, ξj,t) where f˜ is the observation func-
tion and ξj,t is the measurement noise. If the observation function f˜ is binary
then one gets a 0 − 1 output or a noisy ACK/NACK feedback. If f˜ is known
and invertible with the respect to the first component, one can use a non-linear
mean field estimator to track the “true” payoff function simultaneously with
the strategy. As a third alternative, we have seen that no-feedback mean-field
learning is possible. In it, each player estimates the initial mean and iterates of-
fline without any observation/signal from the system. Several questions remain
open:
(i) In the mean-field learning without feedback, How to estimate the starting
point by each player and what is the impact on the inconsistency of the process
with the respect to the mean-field?
(ii) What is the outcome of the mean field game if some fraction of players are
with partially distributed learning, some fraction with fully distributed learning
schemes and some others without any feedback learning?
(iii) How to extend the mean-field learning framework to payoff functions
that depend not only on the mean also but on higher moments or the entire
mean-field distribution?
(iv) Our analysis of speedup learning algorithms are limited to deterministic
function. It is interesting to investigate the stochastic version of (8).
We do not have answers to these questions and postpone them for future
investigation.
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Proof of Theorem 4: Let t ≥ 2. We reiterate the recursive equation
ηt ≤ c2ηo+1t−1 (25)
≤ c2
(
c2η
o+1
t−2
)o+1
= c1+o+12 η
(o+1)2
t−2 (26)
≤ c1+(o+1)2
(
c2η
o+1
t−3
)(o+1)2
(27)
= c
1+(o+1)+(o+1)2
2 η
(o+1)3
t−3 (28)
≤ c1+(o+1)+(o+1)2+...+(o+1)t−12 η(o+1)
t
0 (29)
We remember that for q 6= 1, 1 + q + . . .+ qt−1 = qt−1q−1 . Thus,
ηt ≤ c
(o+1)t−1
o
2 η
(o+1)t
0 .
This means that the convergence time to be within an η∗−neighorbhood of the
mean-field equilibrium is at most for t satisfying c
(o+1)t−1
o
2 η
(o+1)t
0 ≤ η∗. Thus,
(η0c
1
o
2 )
(o+1)t ≤ η∗c 1o2 .
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By taking the logarithm twice, one gets
Tη∗ =
1
ln(o+ 1)
ln


ln
(
1
η∗c
1
o
2
)
ln
(
1
η0c
1
o
2
)


which is the announced result.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Using the strict contraction map f, we estimate the error at time t and get
αt1
1−α1
d(m¯0, m¯
∗) ≤ η
i.e.
αt1 ≤
η(1− α1)
d(m¯0, m¯∗)
.
Taking the logarithm yields,
Tη =
ln[d(m¯0,fix(f))η(1−α1) ]
ln 1α1
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove the convergence time of learning with non-expansive map, we use
the Theorem 2. The error bound to an approximated fixed-point is
2
d(m¯0, f ix(f))√
π
∑t
t′=1 λt′ (1− λt′)
.
Remark that λ(1− λ) ≤ 14 for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the convergence time is at most
for a time t that satisfies
4
d(m¯0, f ix(f))√
πt
≤ η
16d(m¯0, f ix(f))
2
η2π
≤ t.
Hence,
Tη =
16d(m¯0, f ix(f))
2
η2π
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof follows immediately from the geometric
decay inequality in Theorem 3 following similar lines as in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let zt = a∫ t
0
λs ds
. The function z is differentiable
and the time derivative is
z˙t = f(a∫ t
0
λs ds
).
d
dt
[∫ t
0
λs ds
]
= λtf(a∫ t
0
λs ds
) = λtf(zt).
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Moreover, z0 = a0. By Cauchy’s theorem, zt = bt. Suppose now that at reaches
a target set O with at most Ta time units. Then, the trajectory of b reaches the
same set O for at most Tb = g
−1(Ta) where g : t −→
∫ t
0
λs ds. Since if λ ≥ 0
and λ non-integrable then g(t) = Ta has a solution.
If λs = λ, then Tb =
Ta
λ .
If λs = e
s, then Tb = ln(Ta +1), i.e.,
Tb
Ta
goes to zero and b is faster than a.
Proof of Proposition 5:
If the algorithm converges to a some point a∗ then combining the continuity
of the projection map and the continuity of the payoff function, one gets the
righthandside of
a∗j = projAj
[
a∗j
γ∗j
r∗j
]
which is continuous in at. Taking the limit as t goes to infinity, one gets a
∗
j =
aj,max or a
∗ = (I −Mw)−1b and the payoff of player j is r∗j = γ∗j which means
that every player j is satisfied in interior steady state.
Now assume feasibility and assumption A0. Then, From Perron-Frobenius
theorem, we known that (I −Mw)−1 exists and (I −Mw)−1b is positive com-
ponentwise. Under feasibility condition, the algorithm generates an error as
d(at, a
∗) ≤ ρ(Mw)td(a0, a∗),
which provides the convergence of the algorithm to a∗. We use similar analysis
as in Proposition 4 to deduce the convergence time
Tη =
ln[d(a0,a
∗)
η ]
ln 1ρ(Mw)
Proof of Theorem 5:
Following the proof of Proposition 5, one gets that there is some time T ≥ 1
such that for all t ≥ T the spectral radius of the time-varying matrix λtMw +
(1 − λt)I for λt ∈ (1, 2) is less that ρ(Mw) i.e., the reversed Ishikawa has a
superlinear convergence rate. If ρ(Mw) < 1 then both algorithms converge to
the same point and the reverse Ishikawa learning algorithm converges faster
than the Banach-Picard fixed-point. The reverse Ishikawa is a speedup version
of the Banach-Picard algorithm and the announced result follows.
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Graphical analysis for satisfactory solution.
